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COMMERCIAL LAW
I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS'
A. Arbitration
In Sindler v. Batleman,2 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals up-
held an arbitrator's award in a dispute arising out of two joint venture
agreements. Sindler and Batleman had agreed to act as equal partners in
joint ventures and to submit any disputes to arbitration. When the parties
subsequently resorted to arbitration, they set out in their submission to the
arbitrator the facts and matters to be arbitrated. Sindler argued that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority in making his award.
In determining the scope of the arbitrator's authority, the court of ap-
peals applied the "agreement and submission" test instead of the "agree-
ment only" test. The court said that where, as here, a joint venture
agreement between two noncommercial co-equal partners contains a
broad and general arbitration clause, the parties' submission to the arbitra-
tor as well as the language in the agreement must be examined. The
"agreement only" test is appropriately applied only to collective bargain-
ing and commercial situations, because there the parties are presumed to
have reduced all arbitrable issues to writing, whereas in Sindler the arbi-
tration provisions were clearly only general in nature and the submissions
detailed.
1. Cases not included because not sufficiently developmental of the law are:
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth. v. Mergentime Corp., 626 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (prime contractor may set off cost of insurance that he had to purchase when
subcontractor failed to obtain contractually required policy); Greene v. Gibraltar Mortgage
Inv. Corp., 488 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C. 1980) (promissory note and deed of trust held void and
unenforceable as fraudulent and unconscionable where lender failed to disclose essential
terms of loan, such as true cost and a brokerage fee that was exorbitant); Marriott Corp. v.
Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que, Inc. (In re Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que, Inc.), 7 B.R. 92 (B.C. D.C.
1980) (West) (landlord granted relief from automatic stay provisions of Bankruptcy Code
where tenant's leasehold interest was properly forfeited before filing of bankruptcy petition);
Second and E Sts., N.E., Assocs. v. Aries Enterprises, Ltd. (In re Aries Enterprises, Ltd.), 3
B.R. 472 (B.C. D.C. 1980) (West) (District of Columbia tax liens take priority over
competing prior perfected security interest); Management Partnership, Inc. v. Crumlin, 423
A.2d 939 (D.C. 1980) (apartment manager held not to have apparent authority orally to
terminate tenant's liability under a written lease absent proof of agent's authority).
2. 416 A.2d 238 (D.C. 1980).
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B. Damages
In District Concrete Co. v. Bernstein Concrete Corp. ,3 the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals held that a party breaching a supply contract
could not complain about the method chosen to mitigate damages for de-
fective concrete it had furnished if the method chosen was reasonable at
the time. Concrete supplied by District Concrete and used in pouring a
roof proved defective. Bernstein then chose one of two methods, seem-
ingly comparable in time and cost, to correct the resulting structural inade-
quacy. Bernstein's method ultimately cost more than twice the original
estimate.
The court affirmed as to liability and measure of damages. The court
followed a Third Circuit decision' that held, where the plaintiff has a
choice between two reasonable alternatives of obtaining relief, the person
whose wrong created the need cannot complain about the alternative cho-
sen.
C. Enforcement of Contractual Provisions
In Conesco Industries v. Conforti & Eisele, Inc., D.C. , the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held a surety com-
pany liable on a payment bond because the bond's notice provision did not
require notice to be given to the surety as a condition precedent to liability.
Under these circumstances, giving notice to both the general contractor
and the owner was sufficient. Moreover, because here the general contrac-
tor had agreed to indemnify the owner for claims against the owner arising
during the construction project, notice to the general contractor constituted
constructive notice to the owner. Thus, notice only to the general contrac-
tor, and not to the owner, was enough to trigger the surety's liability.
Not finding any District of Columbia law on point, the court permitted
more flexibility regarding notice than it had allowed in its only previous
decision.6 In the earlier decision, the court, following Virginia law, re-
quired strict and timely compliance with the notice provision of a bond as
a condition precedent to the surety's liability.7 Conesco followed Maryland
3. 418 A.2d 1030 (D.C. 1980).
4. In re Kellett Aircraft Corp., 186 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1950). In Kellett, the defaulting
seller contended that the nonbreaching party's selection of the higher of two replacement
bids was inconsistent with its obligation to mitigate damages caused by seller's breach.
5. 627 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
6. United States Plywood Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 157 A.2d 286 (D.C. 1960).
7. Id at 289. The Plywood bond's notice provision was substantially identical to
Conesco's. The subcontractor, however, had failed to give notice to any party within the
required time. This barred the claim. Id at 287-89.
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law, under which bond recovery is the preferred result. Thus, where the
surety does not expressly require receipt of notice, notice is not a condition
precedent for recovery against it.
In Bay General Industries, Inc. v. Johnson,8 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that a lessee of equipment, whose position is analo-
gous to that of a purchaser under a conditional sales contract, may sue the
seller on the theory of third-party beneficiary contract. Bay General had
negotiated with Rodger Johnson to purchase three pieces of equipment,
including a punch press. Phillips Machine and Supply Corporation, Inc.
agreed to "finance" the $9,500 purchase for Bay General by purchasing the
equipment from Johnson and leasing it to Bay General. Johnson, who
agreed to deliver the equipment to Bay General, delivered two pieces but
failed to deliver the punch press.
After attempts at replevin failed, the purchaser and lessee sued the sell-
ers for unlawful detainer, fraudulent conversion, and intentional interfer-
ence with the execution of a replevin writ. The lower court dismissed the
lessee's complaint, holding that Bay General's action was barred by its
lack of contractual privity with the sellers and by its lack of legal title to
the punch press. Reversing, the court of appeals said that Bay General's
lack of privity and legal title did not prevent it from proceeding under a
third-party beneficiary contract theory. The court followed District of Co-
lumbia law allowing a third-party beneficiary to sue to enforce a contract
if the contracting parties intended the third party to benefit directly from
it. In previous cases, that right was grounded in specific contract language
that obligated the party to pay third party claims.9 Bay General extends
the third-party right to sue by holding the obligor liable to a third party
even in the absence of such language.
D. Truth in Lending
In Frazier v. Center Motors, Inc. , " a case of first impression, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a finance company that obtained
an insurance policy for a consumer in connection with a credit transaction,
without first notifying him or obtaining his consent, did not properly dis-
close the premium to the consumer under the Truth in Lending Act" and
8. 418 A.2d 1050 (D.C. 1980).
9. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massman Constr. Co., 402 A.2d 1275 (D.C. 1979); Mo-
ran v. Audette, 217 A.2d 653 (D.C. 1966); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kemp Smith Co., 208
A.2d 737 (D.C. 1965).
10. 418 A.2d 1018 (D.C. 1980).
11. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Title I, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976).
[Vol. 30:718
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Federal Reserve Regulation Z. 2 The premium, therefore, constituted a
finance charge and was includable in the calculation of damages for violat-
ing the Act.' 3
The court explained that Regulation Z excludes premiums for insurance
issued in connection with a credit transaction from the definition of
finance charge under the Truth in Lending Act, provided the creditor gives
the consumer a "clear, conspicuous, and specific" statement disclosing the
cost of insurance if obtained through the creditor and also informs the
consumer that he may choose the person through which insurance is ob-
tained.14 This disclosure must be made before the consummation of the
transaction. Franklin's failure, as creditor, to make the required disclosure
before the sale was consummated, and a fine print statement setting forth
the consumer's insurance rights that was not sufficiently clear and conspic-
uous, resulted in the court's inclusion of the premium in the finance charge
category. The Frazier court joined other jurisdictions that have included a
broad array of charges in the finance charge category.' 5
E Statute of Frauds
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held, in Hackney v. Morelite
Construction,16 that the owner of real property, by stipulating at trial to
facts showing that it orally agreed to grant plaintiffs an option to purchase
the property, waived its right to assert the statute of frauds as a defense to
an action to enforce the option contract. Before Hackney, decisions had
employed equitable and promissory estoppel to disallow the defense. 7
Hackney is the first District case to employ the third ground of waiver.
The court applied a Maryland decision 8 holding that the defendant
waived the defense by his in-court admission that he had made the con-
tested promise. Furthermore, section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial
Code' 9 expressly provides that an agreement not otherwise satisfying the
12. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.15 (1980).
13. Under the Act, the damage award is based on the amount of the finance charge. 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) (1976).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)(6) (1980).
15. See, e.g., Carney v. Worthmore Furniture, Inc., 561 F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1977);
Campbell v. Liberty Financial Planning, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1386 (D. Neb. 1976); Meyers v.
Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. La. 1974), modfed, 539 F.2d 511 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 929 (1977).
16. 418 A.2d 1062 (D.C. 1980).
17. See, e.g., Ammerman v. City Stores Co., 394 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Amberger &
Wohlfarth, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 300 A.2d 460 (D.C. 1973); Easter v. Kass-Berger,
Inc., 121 A.2d 868 (D.C. 1956); Kresge v. Crowley, 47 App. D.C. 13 (1917).
18. Friedman v. Clark, 252 Md. 26, 30, 248 A.2d 867, 871 (1969).
19. D.C. CODE § 28:2-201 (1973).
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requirements of the statute of frauds is enforceable "if the party against
whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or other-
wise in court that a contract for sale was made."2 The court said that no
meaningful difference existed between an in-court admission and the trial
stipulations Morelite agreed to.
F Fraudulent Misrepresentation
In Rothenberg v. Aero Mafyflower Transit Co. ,2 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment
against a moving company for breach of contract after the company noti-
fied the customer in advance of the pick-up date that it could not transport
his goods during the agreed time period. But the court refused to grant
summary judgment against the moving company for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation for not disclosing the company's policy of overbooking orders.22
Sometime after Rothenberg contracted with Aero Mayflower to move his
household goods, the company notified him that it could not move them
during the agreed time. Rothenberg made arrangements with another
mover and had his goods delivered three days after the delivery date Aero
had contracted for.
The court held that Aero's statements constituted an anticipatory breach
of contract. Under District of Columbia law, Rothenberg was entitled to
make alternate arrangements. As to Aero's misrepresentations, the court
held that Rothenberg had failed to establish their materiality. The com-
pany's notice two weeks before the promised pick-up date and three weeks
before the anticipated delivery date rendered the misrepresentations im-
material. The customer received notice sufficiently in advance to allow for
other arrangements, and his goods were delivered to his new home very
near the original delivery date.
G. Enforcement of Mechanic's Lien
In Highpoint Townhouses, Inc. v. Rapp,23 the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals held that a subcontractor who performed plumbing work for a
general contractor without a plumber's license had performed it under an
illegal contract and so was not entitled to a mechanic's lien. Aware that
20. D.C. CODE § 28:2-201(3)(b) (1973).
21. 495 F. Supp. 399 (D.D.C. 1980).
22. Rothenberg alleged other misrepresentations by Aero, including (1) the company's
statement that it could move his shipment within the time period set in the contract and (2)
its failure to disclose that its agents could not determine space availability when the order
for service was signed. 495 F. Supp. at 405.
23. 423 A.2d 932 (D.C. 1980).
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neither Rapp Contracting Co., the subcontractor, nor any of its employees
had a master plumber's license, Columbia Construction Development,
Inc., the general contractor, contracted with Federline, a licensed master
plumber, to obtain the necessary permit to do plumbing work. Columbia
then had Rapp perform the work under Federline's permit. Rapp did so
without any supervision by Federline. The District of Columbia Code24
requires plumbing work to be performed by a licensed master plumber, by
an employee of such, or by someone under the immediate personal super-
vision of the licensed plumber.2" Rapp violated the licensing requirement
because it could not show that it did the work under Federline's immediate
personal supervision. This put Rapp's subcontract in violation of the li-
censing statute, thus rendering it unenforceable under the District's rule
that a contract is void if it violates a licensing law designed to protect the
public. The rule has been invoked previously to prevent recovery for work
performed by unlicensed home improvement contractors, 26architects,27 an
unlicensed practitioner of "healing art,"2'and an unlicensed lender.29
II. LEGISLATION
A. Antitrust
The District of Columbia Antitrust Act of 1980,30 in order to foster com-
petition in the District, creates statutory sanctions and public and private
remedies against unreasonable restraints of trade3' and monopolistic prac-
tices.32 The Act substantially follows federal antitust laws," and autho-
rizes the courts to look to federal decisions when construing the District's
comparable antitrust statutes.34
Under the Act, courts may award declaratory and injunctive relief and
24. D.C. CODE § 2-1406 (1973).
25. D.C. CODE § 2-1405 (Supp. V 1978).
26. Truitt v. Miller, 407 A.2d 1073, 1079 (D.C. 1979); Miller v. Peoples Contractors,
Ltd., 257 A.2d 476, 477 (D.C. 1969).
27. Kirschner v. Klavik, 186 A.2d 227, 229 (D.C. 1962); Holiday Homes, Inc. v. Briley,
122 A.2d 229, 232 (D.C. 1956).
28. Rubin v. Douglas, 59 A.2d 690, 691 (D.C. 1948).
29. Hartman v. Lubar, 133 F.2d 44, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767
(1943).
30. D.C. Law No. 3-169, 28 D.C. R. Reg. 1296, 27 D.C. R. Reg. 5368 (1981) (to be
codified in D.C. CODE §§ 28-4501 to -4518).
31. D.C. Law No. 3-169, § 2 (to be codified in D.C. CODE § 28-4502).
32. Id (to be codified in D.C. CODE § 28-4503).
33. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT ON
BILL 3-107, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ANTITRUST ACT OF 1980, 3d Council, 2d Sess. 4
(Oct. 8, 1980).
34. D.C. Law No. 3-169, § 2 (to be codified in D.C. CODE § 28-4515).
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treble damages, as well as litigation costs and attorney's fees." The Dis-
trict of Columbia Corporation Counsel may issue civil investigative de-
mands for documents, for answers to interrogatories, or for testimony from
persons having information relevant to possible antitrust violations. 36 The
Act includes detailed procedural safeguards to protect the recipient of such
a demand.
Unreasonable restraints of trade and monopolistic practices are classi-
fied as misdemeanors punishable by a maximum $50,000 fine or one year's
imprisonment or both.37 The District government can sue for injuries it
suffers from antitrust violations. The government may also sue as parens
patriae on behalf of individual residents.38 Unlike federal law, 39 the Act
permits indirect purchasers to recover damages for overcharges arising
from antitrust violations that are proven to have been passed on to them. °
Finally, certain regulated industries and legitimate monopolies are par-
tially exempt from the Act's coverage.4'
B. Consumer Protection
The Cooperative Loan Interest Rate Modification Act of 198042 amends
section 28-3301 of the District of Columbia Code4 3 to subject cooperative
housing loans to the same requirements as loans secured by residential
mortgages or deeds of trust." Seller take-back loans must also comply
with these requirements.45 Under the Interest Rate Modification Act of
1979, it was unclear whether seller take-back loans were covered. Under
35. Id (to be codified in D.C. CODE §§ 28-4507, -4508).
36. Id (to be codified in D.C. CODE § 28-4505).
37. Id (to be codified in D.C. CODE § 28-4506).
38. Id. (to be codified in D.C. CODE § 28-4507).
39. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
40. D.C. Law No. 3-169, § 2 (to be codified in D.C. CODE § 28-4509).
41. Id. (to be codified in D.C. CODE § 28-4518).
42. D.C. Law No. 3-73, 27 D.C. R. Reg. 2970, 2270 (1980) (to be codified in D.C. CODE
§ 28-3301).
43. D.C. CODE § 28-3301 (1973), as amended by The Interest Rate Modification Act of
1979, D.C. Law No. 3-38 (Nov. 20, 1979) (codified in D.C. CODE § 28-3301 (Supp. VII
1980)).
44. D.C. Law No. 3-73, § 2(a).
45. COMM. ON FINANCE AND REVENUE, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, RE-
PORT ON BILL 3-223, COOPERATIVE LOAN INTEREST RATE MODIFICATION ACT OF 1979, 3d
Council, 2d Sess. 2 (Jan. 29, 1980). Section 28-3301's requirements, which the amendment
imposes on co-op loans and seller-assisted loans are as follows: (1) the loan must be in
writing and the interest rate may not exceed 15%; (2) the loan must have been contracted for
after October 5, 1979, with no earlier written commitment for the loan at a lower interest
rate; (3) the loan may be prepaid without penalty after three years; and (4) where the bor-
rower has made a down payment of 20% or more, the lender cannot require advance pay-
ments of real property taxes or casualty insurance premiums and the borrower must be
[Vol. 30:718
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the 1979 Act, only loans secured by mortgages or deeds of trust on residen-
tial real property were subject to the requirements.46 Cooperative loans,
not secured by an interest in real property, were exempt from the 1979
amendment.
The Motor Vehicle Finance Charge Amendments Act of 19804' raises
the allowable finance charges for retail installment sales financing for mo-
tor vehicles. The lender may charge the larger of either $25 or charges
based on annual percentage rates for four categories of new and used vehi-
cles. The annual percentage rates range from a low of 21.5% for new vehi-
cles to 28.33% for vehicles more than four years old.48
Prior to this amendment, the allowable finance charges were expressed
in dollars per $100 per year. The rates ranged from $8 per $100 for new
vehicles (14.46% equivalent percentage rate) to $16 per $100 for vehicles
more than four years old (28.33%). 4' The new rates are intended to reflect
current market rates in order to enable automobile dealers to obtain
financing for their installment sales. Under the former limits, dealers were
unable to obtain funds from financing institutions even though dealers had
customers willing to buy. The lending institutions had to borrow at rates
near or above the allowable finance charge rates in order to make such
loans to dealers. They could not make a profit on such loans and thus the
source of such loans for dealers dried up.5"
To improve consumer protection, the amendment adopts the definition
of "finance charge" from the federal Truth in Lending Act.5 Regulation
Z, promulgated under the Truth in Lending Act,52 defines "finance
charge" as "the sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the
customer, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident
to or as a condition of the extension of credit."53
The Rental Housing Locator Consumer Protection Act of 197954 regu-
informed in writing of his right to pay the taxes and premiums directly. D.C. Law No. 3-73,
§ 2(a).
46. D.C. CODE § 28-3301(b) (Supp. VII 1980).
47. D.C. Law No. 3-135, 28 D.C. R. Reg. 1171, 27 D.C. R. Reg. 4526 (1981) (to be
codified in D.C. CODE §§ 40-901, -902; 5AA D.C. R. Reg. §§ 1.2(3) and 307).
48. Id § 2.
49. D.C. CODE § 40-902 (1973).
50. COMM. ON FINANCE AND REVENUE, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, RE-
PORT ON BILL 3-331, MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCE CHARGE AMENDMENTS AT OF 1980, 3d
Council, 2d Sess. 2-3 (July 23, 1980).
51. D.C. Law No. 3-135, § 3. *
52. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Title I, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976).
53. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (1980).
54. D.C. Law No. 3-71, 27 D.C. Reg. 2968, 1891 (1980) (to be codified in D.C. CODE
§ 28-3819).
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lates the rental housing locator business. For a fee, rental housing locator
agencies provide listings of available rental units to customers. The Act
requires rental housing locators to register with the District of Columbia
Office of Consumer Protection. A rental housing locator agency may only
list rental units that have been publicly advertised and offered for rent by
the unit's owner or manager, or units that the owner or manager gives the
agency permission to list. The agency must update every twenty-four hours
all information on rental units it advertises and every forty-eight hours all
information on rental units it does not advertise. 55
Contracts between the locator and customer must be in writing and state
the service offered by the locator, the duration of the contract, and the
refund policy imposed by the Act. The contract must also inform the cus-
tomer that complaints may be filed with the Office of Consumer Protec-
tion. The agency must refund customer fees if the information it provides
is inaccurate, if it fails to provide the correct address or telephone number
of any unit it advertises, or if it fails to provide a customer with listings as
called for in the contract.56
The comprehensive District of Columbia Pharmacist and Pharmacy
Regulation Act of 198037 repeals the District's 1906 pharmacist licensure
law,58 which only regulated the pharmacy practice. The 1980 Act prohibits
anyone from practicing pharmacy who is not either a licensed pharmacist
or a registered pharmacy intern;59 and the intern can practice only under
the direct supervision of a licensed pharmacist.6° All pharmacies in the
District must be licensed under the Act.6 The former law did not require
the licensing of pharmacies or pharmacy interns.
In addition, the Act regulates the operation of pharmacies, including the
conduct of pharmacy personnel, the storage of drugs, prescription label-
ling, record keeping, and it provides for inspections. 62 The Mayor must set
up a continuing education program to help meet the requirements of these
regulations. Pharmacy operation was not addressed by the 1906 law. The
Act establishes a Board of Pharmacy, 63 comprised of two lay persons who
serve as consumer representatives and others who are licensed pharmacists
55. Id §2.
56. Id
57. D.C. Law No. 3-98, 27 D.C. R. Reg. 4267, 3528 (1980) (to be codified in D.C. CODE
§§ 2-601 to -623).
58. D.C. CODE §§ 2-601 to -617 (1973).
59. D.C. Law No. 3-98, § 4(a).
60. Id § 4(b).
61. Id §§ 4(d), 9.
62. I. §§ 10, 12, 14-17.
63. Id §5.
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with six years of experience. 4 The Board will serve in an advisory capac-
ity to guide the administration of the new law.65 The Board's analogue
under the former law had primary responsibility for administering the
1906 Act.66
The Security Alarm Systems Regulations Act of 1980 regulates the sale,
installation, use, and maintenance of security alarm systems.67 The Act's
purpose is to reduce the number of false alarms reported to police.68 User
negligence and equipment malfunction account for most false alarms. 69 In
order to reduce these problems, the Act sets standards of operation and
conduct for security alarm dealers, agents, and users,70 as well as standards
for security alarm systems.7'
Another legislative development should discourage dishonest taxicab
riders who could wind up in jail or pay a hefty fine if they try to get out of
paying their fare. The Taxicab Fare Payment Act of 1980 imposes a fine
of up to $300 or imprisonment up to ten days for such behavior.72
C Uniform Commercial Code-Bulk Transfers
Under the Uniform Commercial Code-Bulk Transfers Amendment
Act of 1979,' 3 additional types of businesses are covered by the require-
ment that creditors be given ten days advance notice of a bulk sale.74 Es-
tablishments such as restaurants, taverns, cafes, cocktail lounges, and
bakeries, where food or drink is furnished for consideration, must now
comply with the notice requirements. 71 Originally, only businesses princi-
pally involved in the sale of merchandise from inventory had to comply;
thus, District creditors in the service industry, particularly restaurant credi-
64. Id
65. Id
66. However, the Board's function was transferred to the Department of Economic De-
velopment in 1969. D.C. CODE §§ 2-607, -608 (1973).
67. D.C. Law No. 3-107, 27 D.C. R. Reg. 4389, 3760 (1980) (to be codified in D.C.
CODE § 1-226).
68. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT ON
BILL 3-67, SECURITY ALARM SYSTEMS ACT OF 1980, 3d Council, 2d Sess. 1-2 (May 28,
1980).
69. Id. at 3.
70. D.C. Law No. 3-107, §§ 6-8.
71. Id § 9.
72. D.C. Law No. 3-117, 28 D.C. R. Reg. 963, 27 D.C. R. Reg. 5636 (1981) (to be
codified in D.C. CODE § 43-914 (104)).
73. D.C. Law No. 3-49, 27 D.C. R. Reg. 657, 26 D.C. R. Reg. 2731 (1980) (to be codi-
fied in D.C. CODE § 28:6-102(3)).
74. D.C. Law No. 3-49 (amends D.C. CODE §§ 28:6-101 to :6-111 (1973)).
75. D.C. Law No. 3-49, § 2.
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tors, suffered a high risk of loss.76 The amendment protects creditors from
these additional bulk sales risks.
D. Securities Act
The District of Columbia City Council amended the District of Colum-
bia Securities Act77 to authorize the Public Service Commission, which
administers the Act, to establish, through rule making, fees for broker-
dealers' and agents' licenses and for other services the Commission fur-
nishes.78 The Commission may also exempt from the statutory net capital
requirement any broker-dealer who, because of the nature of its business,
its financial position, and its safeguards for the protection of customers'
funds and securities, satisfies the Commission that it need not be subject to
the capital requirement.79 The amendment authorizes the Commission to
impose a civil penalty up to $5,000 for violations.8 0 The civil penalty,
when combined with the Commission's power to revoke or suspend a vio-
lator's license,81 affords the Commission greater flexibility in fashioning
appropriate penalties.
Formerly, the Securities Act set specific fees for initial and renewal
licenses. The Public Service Commission has said that under its new
rulemaking authority current fees will more than double, and that it will
impose fees where none have been imposed before-eg., in the areas of
agent license transfer, securities examination, and fingerprinting.82
E Government/Minority Contracting
The Minority Contracting Act of 197683 was amended in 1980 to extend
the life of the Minority Business Opportunity Commission and to change
76. COMM. ON PUBLIC SERVICES AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA, REPORT ON BILL 3-104, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE BULK TRANSFERS
AMENDMENT ACT OF 1979, 3d Council, 1st Sess. 2 (Sept. 18, 1979).
77. D.C. CODE §§ 2-2401 to -2418 (1973). The amendments are contained in The Se-
curities Act Amendments, Personnel Act Clarification, and Voluntary Retirement Act of
1980, D.C. Law No. 3-133, 28 D.C. R. Reg. 1169, 27 D.C. R. Reg. 4417 (1981) (to be codified
in D.C. CODE §§ 2-2404, -2413).
78. D.C. Law No. 3-133, §§ 2(b), (e).
79. Id § 2(d).
80. Id § 2(0.
81. D.C. CODE § 2-2409 (1973).
82. COMM. ON PUBLIC SERVICES AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA, REPORT ON BILL 3-273, SECURITIES ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1980, 3d Council,
2d Sess. Exhibit I (July 8, 1980).
83. D.C. CODE §§ 1-851 to -861 (Supp. V 1978).
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the Commission's appointment and compensation provisions." The
amendment also redefined certain terms. The original Act called for ter-
mination of the Minority Business Opportunity Commission in 1980.85
The life of the Commission now has been extended indefinitely. 6 The
original Commission consisted of seven members who would serve for the
life of the Commission. The amendment calls for staggered two-year
terms for the seven members.8 7 Members must be District of Columbia
residents knowledgeable about the minority business community. 8
The amendment clarifies the definitions of the terms "minority, .... mi-
nority business enterprise," and "local business enterprise."'8 9 The amend-
ment defines "minority" as Black Americans, Native Americans, and
Hispanic Americans who, as members of such groups, are deemed eco-
nomically and socially disadvantaged due to historic patterns of discrimi-
nation. The original definition specified that the term "minority" meant
Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, Orientals, and Eskimos.9"
The Minority Contracting Act of 1976 directed the Minority Business
Opportunity Commission to establish programs to assist local minority
contractors in obtaining government contracts. The amendment expands
the requirements for these programs.91 Only certified minority business
enterprises may participate in a sheltered market program. The original
Act defined a "sheltered market" as the designation of contracts or subcon-
tracts for limited competition from minority business enterprises on either
a negotiated or competitive bid process.92 The amendment also provides
that the programs require the prime contractor to perform at least 50 per-
cent of the contracting effort with its own organization and resources. If
the work is subcontracted, 50 percent of the subcontracting must be with
minority business enterprises. The Commission is also authorized to rec-
ommend that District of Columbia government agencies subdivide their
contracts to achieve greater minority participation.
93
Jacqueline Lussier
84. D.C. Law No. 3-91, 27 D.C. R. Reg. 4169, 3280 (1980) (to be codified in D.C. CODE
§§ 1-852 to -859).
85. D.C. CODE § 1-853 (Supp. V 1978).
86. D.C. Law No. 3-91, § 3(a).
87. Id § 3(b).
88. Id
89. Id §2.
90. D.C. CODE § 1-852(a) (Supp. V 1978).
91. D.C. Law No. 3-91, § 5(c).
92. D.C. CODE § 1-852(g) (Supp. V 1978).
93. D.C. Law No. 3-91, § 5(g).
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